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1 Introduction
Government procurement of goods and services represents more than 18% of the world
GDP.1 For year 2002 this yields an estimate of USD 5.8 trillion. Despite the amounts at
stake, tax-payers’ ability and incentives to monitor public purchases are weak. Corrup-
tion is thus a major problem. The OECD Antibribery Convention, which came into force
in February 1999, has apparently failed to cure it. It has resulted in only a handful of
investigations and no conviction in the 35 signatory countries. In a study conducted by
Transparency International (TI) to build its second Bribe Payers Index of leading export-
ing countries, in 2002, 60% of the respondents claimed that corruption in international
business had increased or remained the same. When the respondents were asked to iden-
tify the business sectors in which bribery most commonly occurred, they said first public
works contracts and construction, followed by the arms and defense industry. These are
also the sectors where the biggest bribes are likely to be paid.2 Anecdotal evidences sup-
port the survey results.3 According to an ongoing research at the World Bank, the total
amount of bribery for public procurement can hence be estimated in the vicinity of USD
200 billion per year.4 That is, approximately 3.5% of the world procurement spending.
Assuming this figure is accurate, it represents only one part of the overall cost of corrup-
tion because corruption usually involves allocative inefficiency on top of the bribes. Since
in practice nobody knows what would have been the final cost of the purchase if the most
1The OECD Trade Committee covering 130 countries estimates that the size of all levels of government
procurement markets (i.e., consumption and investment expenditure) expressed as a percentage of 1998
GDP data is 18.42% (see OECD 2002). For the OECD countries as a whole the ratio is 19.96% (or USD
4733 billion) and for the non-OECD countries it is estimated at 14.48% (or USD 816 billion).
2For more on the survey see www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#bpi.
3For instance, the US group Lockheed was condemned to pay USD 24,8 million in fine for bribing a
member of the Egyptian Popular Assembly to sell three C130 cargo airplanes (Le Monde 1995).
4For comments on the study see at the World Bank web page ”Six questions on the cost of corruption”
with Daniel Kaufmann.
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efficient supplier, rather than the biggest briber, had won the tender, it is not possible
to estimate the real cost of corruption with classical survey techniques. The paper pro-
poses a theoretical approach based on classical procurement theory to study the effect of
corruption on the purchase cost. It distinguishes two forms of corruption.
Capture occurs when a firm bribes a public official to obtain a trading advantage. This
corresponds to ‘active bribery’ as termed in the OECD Convention. On the other hand,
extortion occurs when a firm complies with a demand for a bribe to avoid being excluded
from trade. This type of bribes is referred to as ’facilitation payments’ by international
legislation. The paper shows that the two forms of corruption are not equivalent in
terms of the cost they impose on the tax-payers. Capture, which obstructs allocative
efficiency, yields a dead-weight loss; extortion does not. The paper illustrates the result
by computing the tax-payers’ loss. It relies on data on federal US procurement and on
e-procurement to calibrate the capture dead-weight loss. According to the computation
the total capture cost represents between 1.2 and 2.88 times the amount of the bribes. If
the USD 200 billion figure is accurate, in 2002 the tax-payers should be willing to allocate
at least USD 240 billion worldwide to fight capture.
The paper studies then how incentives and rules for decision should be set to respond
to the capture threat. First, public purchasers should receive incentive payments to resist
capture. The paper shows that the bonuses increase with market size so that achieving
zero capture level is not efficient. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is then better to
have few markets affected by capture with high bribes rather than a generalized system
of capture with a smaller level of bribes. Concentration minimizes the total capture dead-
weight loss. Subsequently the paper derives the optimal delegation scheme integrating
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the cost of the incentive payment. The legal framework that emerges from the theoretical
analysis involves open tender for larger purchases, and no monitoring for smaller ones.
The rule is independent of a country’s characteristics. Fighting capture in large purchases
then requires to develop international agreements, such as the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA). For markets of medium range, national legislation may differ because
the optimal rule depends on a country’s characteristics. Static comparative analysis hence
shows that when a society’s susceptibility to corruption rises, there is a shift from the
costly capture regime to the extortion regime in which no monetary incentives are needed.
This result seems especially relevant for developing countries where the government bud-
get constraint is tight. In poor countries plagued with corruption, corruption in public
purchase runs high and takes the extreme form of extortion. This helps to explain why
the bribes paid to foreign public officials used to be tax deductible in OECD countries:
The firms wanted the ”commissions” to be acknowledged as a cost.5 The problem is that
national legislation never drew the line between facilitation payments and other bribes.
The paper shows that there should be a clear legal distinction between the two.
The issue of collusion in organizations within the agency theoretical approach was first
raised by Tirole (1986) in a principal-supervisor-agent model. In this paper he derived
a ‘collusion-proofness principle’, showing that any feasible payoff to the principal can be
achieved by a contract which does not induce collusion between the agent and the su-
pervisor. This seminal framework has since been used to study the impact of collusion
in different contexts.6 The main results of this literature is that to fight collusion, it is
5In 1997, bribes paid to foreign officials were still tax deductible in Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Iceland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland.
6See for instance Laffont and Tirole (1993), Carillo (2000), Hindriks & al (1999), Campbell (1996)).
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optimal, first, to change the agent’s contract in order to lower the benefit of collusion, and,
second, to reduce the supervisor’s discretion. One concern with the collusion-proofness
principle is that it is not robust if one relaxes the assumption that the susceptibility to
corruption of the supervisor is common knowledge. Kofman and Lawarre´e (1996) and
Strausz (1998) hence show that under asymmetric information it is optimal to tolerate
some corruption.7 Another concern with Tirole (1986) framework is that it focuses on
mutually beneficial agreements between the supervisor and the agent. As stressed by
the literature on blackmail (see Mogiljanski (1994), Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) and
Leppamaki (2000)) extortion exists in practice. The present paper which combines Ti-
role (1986) framework with the assumption that the integrity of the supervisor is not
observable, considers both capture and extortion.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 derives
the optimal contracts under the assumption that the delegate is incorruptible. Section
4 considers the possibility of corruption. Section 5 proposes a calibration of the capture
cost. Our main findings are summarized in Section 6.
2 The model
As in Tirole (1986) the paper considers a three-tier hierarchy: principal, delegate, firms.
All the players are assumed to be risk neutral. The principal (i.e. the tax-payers),
conventionally a ’he’, wants to acquire a commodity or a service in the best possible
conditions. He entrusts the responsibility of the acquisition to a delegate (e.g, a public
servant or a public representative), conventionally a ’she’. The principal’s objective is to
7Kofman and Lawarre´e (1993) were the first to explain collusion as an equilibrium phenomenon (see
also Khalil and Lawarre´e (1994) and Bac (1996)).
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maximize the net surplus associated with the public acquisition. The size of the market
is fixed Q ≥ 0. It generates a gross surplus S(Q) ≥ 0 increasing with Q (S ′(Q) > 0). We
assume that S(Q) is large so that it is always worth procuring.
The firms: There are N(≥ 1) potential firms in the economy. Depending on the com-
modity and on the economic circumstances, N varies. The distribution of N is common
knowledge.8
A1 N ∈ {N,N} with α = Prob (N = N).
To serve the market the firms are confronted with a constant marginal cost function:
Ci(βi, qi) = βiqi βi ∈ [β, β] i = 1, ..., N. (1)
The term qi ≥ 0 is the output of firm i in total production (∑Ni=1 qi = Q), and βi is
firm i’s marginal cost. The market share qi is verifiable while βi is privately known. We
assume that at the pre-contracting stage a firm does not know the exact value of βi. This
assumption reflects the fact that there are idiosyncratic shocks affecting the production
process. From an ex-ante point of view, the βi are independently and identically dis-
tributed on [β, β] according to the density function f(.) associated with the distribution
function F (.). The support [β, β], and the functions F (.), f(.) are common knowledge.
To avoid bunching, we make the classical monotone hazard rate assumption:
A2 F (β)/f(β) is non decreasing for all β ∈ [β, β].
The delegate: The delegate’s job is to implement the acquisition procedure. She can
either negotiate the market with a producer, in which case she needs to identify one,
this corresponds to limited tendering as termed in the General Procurement Agreement
8We assume that it is binomial, but we could consider more general distribution.
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(GPA), or allocate it through competitive bidding procedure, this corresponds to open
tender as termed in the GPA. The optimal decision depends on the relative cost to foster
competition compared to the expected benefit. The cost of running open tender which
is common knowledge, is fixed K ≥ 0. It embodies the monetary and non monetary
(delay) costs of the procedure. In practice these costs are very high.9 The benefit on
the other hand is uncertain. It depends on how successful the bidding procedure is, that
is, on N the number of firms that submit an offer. The principal in the paper are the
taxpayers. It is impossible for them to know in advance the number of potential bidders
in the public markets to come. The principal simply knows that some markets are going
to be competitive and that others are not going to be competitive. Since this information
is crucial to choose the acquisition procedure, the delegate job is to gather information
on the competitiveness of the market.10
The information acquisition process is exogeneous. The delegate holds information,
denoted σ, on N . Following Laffont and Tirole (1993) we assume that with probability ξ
the delegate information is pertinent and with probability 1− ξ it is uninformative.
A3 σ ∈ {N, ∅} with ξ = Prob(σ = N).
The information received by the delegate is hard evidence. When she is informed
that σ = N or that σ = N , she can prove it in court. However she can always hide her
9It takes time and money to organize open tenders. First the purchasing entity has to specify its need
in writing. Next it has to advertise tender information in official gazettes, newspapers, bulletin board
or bidding information journals. If the firms that get the information are interested they have to work
out detailed offers. The purchasing entity has to review and evaluate the offers. Finally it has to write
a report to justify its choice. E-procurement reduces substantially these costs. For instance the State
of California was able to save USD 9.7 million annually in procedural costs simply by switching from
manual to online processing of purchase orders (see www.pd.dgs.ca.gov/calbuy/aboutcalby.htm).
10In the process she is also supposed to gather information on the identity of the potential bidders.
Actually finding names is an important part of her job. For each purchase there is hence a name to single
out in case of sole sourcing and a list of names to gather in case of competitive bidding.
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information and pretend that σˆ = ∅. This claim is impossible –extremely costly– to verify.
The principal needs to provide incentives to make the delegate reveal σ. The minimal
bonus which ensures truthful revelation depends on a personal discount rate for illegal
revenue, δ ∈ [0,+∞). Term δ reflects the individual integrity “price”: one unit of money
received illegally is worth 1
1+δ
≤ 1 to her. Finally the delegate needs to receive at least
her reservation income, normalized without loss of generality to zero. This fixed wage
ensures her participation but provides no guarantee concerning her loyalty at work.
The timing:
t = 1 The principal sets the delegate’s contract and the acquisition rules. He entrusts the
enforcement of the acquisition rules to the delegate.
t = 2 Nature chooses N ; The delegate obtains information σ about N ,
t = 3 The delegate who gets all the bargaining power, meets with one firm; Side contract-
ing occurs;11
t = 4 The delegate announces σˆ; she chooses competitive bidding or sole sourcing accord-
ing to the rule edited by the principal.
− If it is competitive bidding, the delegate sinks K and opens the market; Nature chooses
(β1, ..., βN); The N potential producers discover βi; bidding takes place.
− If it is sole sourcing, the delegate selects a firm; Nature chooses βi; the firm discovers
βi; negotiation takes place.
t = 5 Contracts are signed, production and transfer occur.
Step 3 corresponds to the corruption stage. We assume that the delegate gets all the
bargaining power in the secret negotiation because if the firm refused her take-it-or-leave-
11At this stage of the game, both the firm and the delegate ignore the realization of β. The bribes are
chosen based on the future expected profit of the firm.
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it offer she would make the same offer to a competitor. The bribe she gets is the maximum
that a producer is willing to pay to secure a monopoly position. It is not important which
one is chosen; Ex-ante, they are all symmetric. The next section provides the benchmark
case of an incorruptible delegate (i.e., δ = +∞).
3 Benevolent Delegate: δ = +∞
3.1 Sole Sourcing: In the sole source case the delegate duty is to find a producer to
serve the market.12 Since she cannot observe the firm’s marginal cost, the total acquisition
cost is equal to t(β) = βQ.13 The sole source case corresponds to a fixed price purchase.
The identity of the producer then is irrelevant to the tax-payers. The principal’s net
expected surplus is constant, W = S(Q) − βQ. On the other hand, the firm net profit,
Π(β) = (β − β)Q, decreases with β.
3.2 Competitive Bidding: When the delegate chooses a competitive procedure,
since the firms’ cost parameters are independently and identically distributed, it is optimal
under asymmetry of information to organize a second price type of auction (see Myerson
(1981)).14 The rent that a producer gets on expectation when he is one of N bidders of
such an auction is:
EΠi
N
= Q
∫ β
β
[1− F (β)]N−1F (β)dβ i = 1, ..., N. (2)
Compared with the sole source case, the expected rent in (2) is reduced by [1−F (β)]N−1
12The way she identifies one is irrelevant for the analysis. We leave it a black-box.
13With a single producer we drop for notation simplicity the index of the firm.
14The firms submit independently a price above which they accept to serve the market. The market
is attributed to the firm with the lowest bid, but the price it gets in exchange for the production is the
second lowest bid. With such an auction it is a dominant strategy for each producer to announce its true
marginal cost.
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which is the probability that a firm of type β is not minimizing the acquisition cost.15
Let fNmin(β) = N [1−F (β)]N−1f(β) denote the density function of min(β1, ..., βN) the
minimum of N independent variable of type βi, and FNmin(β) = 1 − [1 − F (β)]N the cu-
mulative distribution function. We deduce from (2) that
∑N
i=1 EΠ
i
N
= Q
∫ β
β
F (β)
f(β)
dFNmin(β).
The net expected surplus from competitive sourcing with N bidders is:
EWN = S(Q)−Q
∫ β
β
(
β + F (β)
f(β)
)
dF
N
min(β)−K. (3)
A comparison of the welfare under sole sourcing with the welfare under competitive
bidding omitting the fixed cost, yields after an integration by part EWN −W + K =
Q
∫ β
β [1 +
d
dβ
F (β)
f(β)
]
(
F
N
min(β) − F (β)
)
dβ ≥ 0.16 By introducing competition, the delegate
reduces the producers’ expected rent. Since these rents are a cost to the principal, com-
petitive bidding increases his surplus by that much amount. The benefit grows as com-
petition intensifies (the difference between F
N
min(.) and F (.) increases with N). Indeed,
when the number of bidders is large they collectively bid more aggressively, which reduces
the final cost. We define k(N) as the marginal social benefit of introducing competition:
k(N) =
∫ β
β
[
1 + d
dβ
F (β)
f(β)
][
F
N
min(β)− F (β)
]
dβ. (4)
The choice between sole sourcing and competitive bidding reduces to the following
trade-off. Competitive bidding yields a procedural cost K but gives a higher probability
of a small acquisition cost, the sampling effect which is captured by Qk(N).17 As N is
unknown ex ante, k(N) is a random variable. The expected value of k(N) depends on
the information available on N . Let k = k(N), k = k(N), and Ek = αk + (1− α)k. We
15In the sole source case Π(β) = (β − β)Q so that EΠ(β) = Q ∫ β
β
F (β)dβ.
16The expected surplus under sole sourcing is W = S(Q)− βQ = S(Q)−Q ∫ β
β
(
β + F (β)f(β)
)
dF (β).
17For more on the sampling effect see Auriol and Laffont (1993), Auriol (1996).
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deduce from (4) that k ≤ Ek ≤ k. Conditionally on σ we get E[k(N) | N ] = k(N) and
E[k(N) | ∅] = Ek.
Proposition 1 The optimal acquisition policy consists of choosing open tendering when-
ever K is lower than QE[k(N) |σ] and limited tendering otherwise.
Competitive acquisition is more valuable when the number of bidders N is large and
when the level of procedural cost K is low. Moreover, the expected gain associated
with competitive bidding increases with Q. The impact of a decrease in the marginal
acquisition cost is proportional to the market size. Efficiency, which is not a big issue
for small markets (flexibility and rapidity are more important factors) is crucial for the
large ones. In most countries in the world there are hence minimum thresholds for open
tendering. We study next the optimal delegation scheme when the delegate is corruptible.
4 Corruptible Delegate: δ < +∞
By virtue of Proposition 1 when Q ≤ K
k
(i.e., the market is small) or when Q ≥ K
k
(i.e.,
the market is big) the information possessed by the delegate on N is socially useless.
There is no stake for corruption.18 On the other hand, when K
k
≤ Q ≤ K
Ek
, the optimal
policy entails open tender if σ = N , and limited tender otherwise. Since her information
is pivotal, the delegate is free to choose the acquisition strategy whenever σ = N . Then if
a firm successfully captures the delegate, the principal ends up with the wrong decision,
namely limited tendering in favor of the briber, whenever σ = N . Finally, when K
Ek
≤ Q ≤
K
k
, the optimal policy involves limited tendering if σ = N, and open tendering otherwise.
18When Q ≤ K
k
The optimal acquisition policy is limited tendering independently of the signal σ
received by the delegate. Symmetrically, when Q ≥ Kk , the optimal policy is open tendering independently
on σ.
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In the case σ = N , the delegate can threaten a legitimate supplier of exclusion either by
selecting a competitor, or worse for the taxpayers, by implementing open tendering (i.e.,
by claiming σˆ = ∅) if it refuses to pay a bribe. This kind of corruption is called extortion:
the firm does not want to bribe the delegate but is obliged to.
Figure 1 represents the possibilities of corruption in function of the market size Q.
“Limited tender” and “open tender” are corruption-free zones. On the other hand cor-
ruption is called capture if the delegate decides to use limited tendering while she privately
knows open tendering is optimal. It is called extortion if she asks a bribe from a firm
while she privately knows limited tendering is optimal.
K/k K/Ek K/k
limited tender capture extortion open tender Q
Figure 1
Extortion occurs when the optimal acquisition strategy is the fixed price purchase.
To avoid being excluded from trade, a supplier abandons a share of its expected profit
to the delegate. This alters the distribution of the rent between the delegate and the
firm, but has no impact on the total acquisition cost. The taxpayers pay βQ anyway.
In other words, extortion does not increase the final purchase cost. Since the burden of
extortion lies entirely on the firms’ shoulders, in the static context of the paper, fighting
extortion generates costs and no benefit for taxpayers. The principal does not invest
resources preventing the delegate from getting a kickback. Theoretically, it means that
the collusion-proofness result does not hold when taking into account the possibility of
extortion.19 Capture is different because it involves sole sourcing instead of competitive
19This does not imply that extortion is a social good. In practice people do not accept passively to be
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bidding when σ = N is pivotal information. The social loss associated with capture is
L = Qk(N) (5)
with k(N) defined equation (4). In comparison the firm’s benefit from capture is: ∆Π =
EΠ−EΠi
N
. It is an expected term because at the side-contracting stage the firms do not
know the exact value of β. Then the stake for collusion is fixed and known to everybody
which greatly simplifies the analysis of the corruption game. Let:
∆pi =
∫ β
β
[
1− [1− F (β)]N−1
]
F (β)dβ. (6)
One can check that ∆Π = Q∆pi. The next proposition establishes that capture creates a
dead-weight loss. The proof is in Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 Contrary to extortion, capture increases the final purchase cost; The tax-
payers’ loss is higher than the firm’s capture rent: L ≥ Q∆pi for all N ≥ 2.
Capture involves allocative inefficiency on top of the bribes.20 It is not possible to
assess the extra cost by classical survey techniques because nobody knows what would
have been the final purchase cost if the most efficient supplier had won the tender. This
information is out of equilibrium. To get a first approximation of the tax-payers’ loss,
one possibility consists in calibrating equation (5). In the absence of a better source of
information the methodology provides a first estimate. Let ∆β = β−β. We assume that
A6 β is uniformly distributed over [β, β + ∆β].
extorted. They try to bypass public agencies to avoid extortion. This shunting behavior might generate
high efficiency costs. Moreover, in practice, susceptibility to corruption is endogeneous. Tolerating
extortion might lead to an increase in corruption (i.e., a decrease in δ). Then more extortion will also
mean more capture. Studying these dynamic effects is beyond the scope of the paper.
20For instance, using electronic eavesdropping the US intelligence community maintained a top-secret
database of international bribery cases. It lists hundreds of contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars
that went to the biggest briber rather than the highest bidder, over the past 18 years (NBC 2000).
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Assumption A6 implies equation (5) that L = ∆βQN−1
N+1
.21 Let b denote the percentage
of the total market cost which is paid in bribes: B = b(β + ∆β)Q. We obtain after some
straightforward computations:
L =
∆β
β + ∆β
N − 1
N + 1
B
b
. (7)
The calibration exercise of (7) involves three terms. The first one represents in per-
centage the reduction of the purchasing price that would be realized if one could move
from pure monopoly (i.e., from price (β + ∆β)Q when N = 1) to perfectly competitive
sourcing (i.e., to price βQ when N = +∞). It is possible to assess a lower bound for
∆β
β+∆β
by looking at the impact of e-procurement on purchasing prices.22 Cases studies in
the public sector reveal price reduction on the order of 20%.23 This figure is consistent
with the 20% saving found by Domberger, Hall and Lee (1995) in their survey of the
empirical literature on the impact of introducing competitive tendering in purchasing. A
lower bound for ∆β
β+∆β
then is 0.2.24 The second term in (7) depends on N the number
of bidders that would show up at a fair open tender. We rely on the US federal procure-
21The expected social loss associated with capture is increasing and concave in N the number of bidders
that would have competed in a fair open procedure. It varies between L = ∆Π when N = 2 and L = 2∆Π
when N → +∞. This result is consistent with the empirical study by Iimi (2003) on procurement auctions
for official development assistance. It shows that the bid prices decrease with the number of bidders in a
convex fashion. Moving from open to limited tender hence yields a loss increasing and concave in N .
22E-procurement reduces substantially procurement procedural cost. The firms registered into the
system receive automatically the tender offers. If they wish to submit an offer they do it electronically
from their office. Since more firms are informed of the tender, and since it is less costly for them to submit
an offer, the number of bidders increases. For instance, the number of bidders has been multiplied by 3
since the Korean administration completed its move from classical procurement to e-procurement (Park
and Shin (2004)).
23For instance the introduction of e-procurement system in Brazil, COMPRASNET, and in Mexico,
Compranet, brings an average 20% reduction of the final price for goods and services for both federal gov-
ernments. See www.egov4dev.org/mexeproc.htm and www.egov4dev.org/brazeproc.htm (18/06/2004).
Similarly since Romania introduced its e-GP system it saved some 22% on its purchases (IDA 2003).
24It represents a lower bound because in practice the purchases do not move from pure monopoly
to perfect competition. For instance, the study by Kivisto and Virolainen (2005) on municipal public
procurement activities in Finland focusing on a few selected basic products such as peeled potatoes or
paper towels, reveals prices dispersion up to 180%. The minimum prices dispersion in the sample is 10%.
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ment data to calibrate this term. Appendix 3 shows that the average number of tenders
weighted by their market value is EN = 7.139. Setting N = 7 yields N−1
N+1
= 0.75. On
the other hand a lower bound for N is 3. It implies that N−1
N+1
= 0.5.25 We deduce that
N−1
N+1
∈ [0.5, 0.75]. Finally, a crucial parameter in calibrating the cost of capture is b. For a
given amount of bribes B, if b is small the annual volume of tainted procurement projects
is large. That is, B
b
= T c represents the worldwide public procurement spending which is
affected by capture. Everything else being equal, it is better to have capture concentrated
on a few markets with large bribes (i.e., with a large b), rather than to have it widespread
with a smaller level of bribes. Indeed the capture dead-weight loss, L − ∆Π, increases
(linearly) with T c. From a practical point of view, estimates of b are available through
survey techniques and police investigations. The examples listed in Appendix 3 suggest
that a reasonable lower bound for b is 5%. On the other hand, the upper bound is 1
12
. We
set b ∈ [0.05, 1
12
]. The taxpayers’ loss then is L ∈ [1.2, 2.88]B.
If the World Bank estimate, B = 200, is accurate, in 2002 a lower bound for the
worldwide loss of capture is USD 240 billion. An upper bound is USD 576 billion. The
estimates represent between 4.14 % and 9.93% of the world procurement spending. Even
if these figures cannot be taken too literally, the magnitude of the dead-weight loss reveals
a major economic problem. In what follows, we derive the optimal delegation framework
to fight against it. We first consider the benchmark case where δ is observable to all.
4.1 The Symmetric Information Case
Under the assumption that δ ∈ [0,+∞) is observable, any possible outcome can be ob-
tained through a capture-proof contract (see Tirole 1986). There is, thus, no loss of
25See Appendix 3 for the computation, and see also footnote 22 for economic justification of N ≥ 3.
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generality to restrict the analysis to situations where there is no bribe for capture in equi-
librium. In equilibrium there is coexistence of the full revelation of delegate information
and corruption (i.e. extortion). Let xσ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the principal
chooses competitive bidding when the information disclosed by the delegate is σ and 1-xσ
the probability that he chooses sole sourcing, σ ∈ {N,N, ∅}. The capture-proof rent is a
bonus awarded to the delegate when σ = N is pivotal information. More precisely, the
delegate behaves honestly if she receives from the principal the maximum amount she can
get in bribes, by assumption ∆Π, discounted by 1 + δ.
As explained above σ = N is pivotal when x
N
= 1 and x∅ = 0. The bonus is set to
match the discounted capture rent, B = Q∆pi
1+δ
. Then a capture-proofness contract for the
delegate is:
R(σ) =

x
N
(1− x∅)Q∆pi
1+δ
if σ = N ,
0 otherwise
Let
κ = αξ
αξ+1−ξk +
(1−ξ)
αξ+1−ξEk (8)
be a convex combination of k and Ek, and let
λ(δ) = 1− 1
1 + δ
∆pi
k
. (9)
Term Qkλ(δ) represents the tax-payers’ gain of implementing a capture-proof contract.
The following result is proven in Appendix 1.
Proposition 3 When the corruptibility of the delegate δ is known, the optimal delegation
framework distinguishes four regimes:
(i) Qλ(δ) ≤ K
k
∀Q ≤ K
κ
: the acquisition procedure is limited tender.
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(ii) Qλ(δ) ≥ Max{K
k
, Q[αξk+(1−ξ)Ek]−(1−ξ)K
αξk
} ∀Q ∈ [K
k
, K
Ek
]: the acquisition procedure
depends on delegate information sustained by capture-proof contracts.
(iii) Qλ(δ) ≤ Q[αξk+(1−ξ)Ek]−(1−ξ)K
αξk
∀Q ∈ [K
κ
, K
k
]: the acquisition procedure depends
naively on delegate announcement so that extortion occurs.
(iv) Q ≥ K
k
: the acquisition procedure is open tender.
-
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Figure 2: The Symmetric Information Case
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3. The line Qλ(δ) describes the regime to be imple-
mented in function of Q.
Contrary to the first best case, the purchasing procedure depends both on the market
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value Q and on the delegate susceptibility to corruption δ. To get an intuition of how
conditions (i) to (iv) are derived, consider first the limit case where the delegate is not
corruptible (i.e., λ(+∞) = 1). It is easy to check that Proposition 1 and 3 coincide.
Similarly when δ is finite the optimal rule is first best for Q ∈ [0, K
k
] ∪ [ K
Ek
,+∞). As
illustrated by Figure 2 the distortion of the rule appears only for Q ∈ [K
k
K
Ek
]. Indeed, to
deter the capture threat, the principal needs to offer incentive contracts to the delegate.
The bonus increases the purchase cost. The principal compares the expected benefit
of implementing the optimal acquisition decision with the capture-proof rent. He relies
on the delegate expertise only if Qλ(δ) ≥ K
k
. From (9), λ(δ) which is lower than 1,
is increasing in δ. The interval in term of market size, where the principal implements
capture-proof contracts, shrinks when δ decreases.26 For very corrupted agents the capture
regime may be totally suppressed. That is, for the low value of δ, Qλ(δ) ≤ K
k
∀Q ∈ [K
k
, K
Ek
],
may occur. The delegate receives a flat wage –her reservation wage– and the principal
is confronted with the following choice. He can either neglect’s the delegate information
–limited tender– or partly use it –extortion regime. It is easy to check that extortion
dominates limited tendering when Q ∈ [K
κ
, K
Ek
], and that the reverse is true when Q ∈
[K
k
, K
κ
]. In this case, the delegate retains choice only for Q ∈ [K
κ
, K
k
], as compared to
Q ∈ [K
k
, K
k
] in the first best. In response to the capture threat, the principal reduces
the delegate’s discretion. This is the lack of discretion result stressed by the collusion-
proofness literature.
26Proposition 3 establishes that for a given Q ∈ [K
k
, KEk ], the capture-proof regime is im-
plemented only if Qλ(δc) ≥ Max{Kk ,
Q[αξk+(1−ξ)Ek]−(1−ξ)K
αξk
}. From (9) λ(δ) increases with δ;
Max{K
k
, Q[αξk+(1−ξ)Ek]−(1−ξ)K
αξk
} is independent of δ. We deduce the result.
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4.2 The Asymmetric Information Case
As first pointed out by Kofman and Lawarre´e (1996) and by Strausz (1998), it is not
realistic to assume that the principal knows the corruptibility of his delegates. If he was
able to identify corruptibility, he would hire honest delegates only. The principal does not
know δ, but has a prior on this parameter given by the distribution function G(δ) and
the density function g(δ) over [0,+∞) satisfying the monotone hazard rate property.
A4
1−G(δ)
g(δ)
is decreasing ∀δ ∈ [0,+∞).
To capture the idea that corruption varies across place and time, a population iden-
tified by its distribution function Gθ(.) over [0,+∞) is said to be more corrupted than a
population identified by the distribution function Gθ′(.) if the following condition holds.
A5 1−Gθ(δ)
gθ(δ)
≤ 1−Gθ′ (δ)
gθ′ (δ)
∀δ ∈ [0,+∞).
Assumption 5 implies that a population which is corrupted is associated with lower
bribes’ discount rate than a more honest one.
If the principal cannot observe the delegates’ type, he is not able to tailor the contracts
in function of δ. To be sure that the most corrupted delegate (i.e. δ = 0) will cooperate
honestly, he has to abandon Q∆pi to all. He prefers to offer less, accepting in exchange
the risk of having some capture in equilibrium. The principal chooses a critical value δl
to optimize on the bonus Q∆pi
1+δl
that he offers to the delegate in exchange for the pivotal
information σ = N . If the delegate he faces is relatively honest (is of type δ ≥ δl), she
accepts the bonus and reports truthfully, which yields a net surplus EWN − Q∆pi
1+δl
. If
she is corrupted (is of type δ ≤ δl), she prefers to hide her information and to collude
with a producer, which yields the net surplus EW . The principal chooses δl to solve
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Maxδ [1−G(δ)]
(
EWN − Q∆pi
1+δ
)
+G(δ)EW (see Appendix 1). We deduce that δl satisfies
the following equation:27
1−G(δl)
g(δl)
1
(1 + δl)2
+
1
1 + δl
=
Qk −K
Q∆pi
. (10)
The marginal benefit associated with the decrease of the rent distributed to the honest
fraction of the population, [1 − G(δl)] Q∆pi
(1+δl)2
, is equalized to the marginal cost of the
increase in the number of captured delegates implementing distorted acquisition decisions,
g(δl)[Qk− Q∆pi
1+δl
−K]. From equation (10), one can check that δl decreases with Q. Indeed,
for the large value of Q, an anti-competitive bias in the attribution process generates
substantial cost overruns. To limit such a bias, the principal strengthens the delegate’s
incentives by increasing her unitary reward. Since δl decreases, the probability that
the delegate is captured, G(δl), thus decreases with market size Q. Moreover, one can
check that the optimal delegate’s reward decreases when the level of corruption decreases
among the population (δl increases when delegate distribution shifts in A5 sense). If
honesty rises among the population, more delegates are going to take the principal’s
bonus rather than bribes. It becomes very costly to offer Q∆pi
1+δl
to all of them, so the
principal lowers the bonus. Theoretically, the collusion-proofness result does not hold
when δ is not observable. Achieving zero corruption level is not a sensible objective for a
government. The next proposition shows how the optimal delegation policy is distorted
by the asymmetric information on δ. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 in
Appendix 1.
Proposition 4 When δ is not observable, the optimal delegation framework distinguishes
four regimes to be implemented by the delegate in function of market size Q:
27To avoid a corner solution we assume that Qk −Q∆pi −K < 0 and that G(.) is non degenerate.
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(i) Q ≤ K
k
: the acquisition procedure is limited tender.
(ii) Qλ(δl) − K
k
≥ αξ+1−ξ
αξ
κQ−K
k
∀Q ∈ [K
k
, K
Ek
]: the acquisition procedure depends on
delegate announcement sustained by the incentive payment Q∆pi
1+δl
so that capture occurs
with probability G(δl)).
(iii) Qλ(δl) − K
k
≤ αξ+1−ξ
αξ
κQ−K
k
∀Q ∈ [K
κ
, K
k
]: the acquisition procedure depends on
the delegate’s information so that extortion occurs.
(iv) Q ≥ K
k
: the acquisition procedure is open tender.
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Figure 3: The Asymmetric Information Case
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 4. It is drawn for the distribution function Gθ(δ) =
1 − [ 1
1+δ
]θ δ ∈ [0,+∞], θ > 0.28 For a given Q, the line Qλ(δl) − K
k
= 1
1+θ
(Q − K
k
)
28It is parameterized by θ such that the greater θ is, the more the population is corrupted. The fraction
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provides the regime to be implemented.
The first result from Proposition 4 is that whatever the principal’s belief in the corrupt-
ibility of the society, the rules concerning limited and open tender are first best. Limited
tender is implemented when kQ ≤ K, open tender when kQ ≥ K (see (i) and (iv)).
The rule is independent of the distribution function G(δ). This suggests that large public
purchases should be ruled by international legislation. For instance, European legislation
requires from EU members to publish procurement contracts in the Official Journal of the
European Communities once they reach the values mentioned in the Government Pro-
curement Agreement (GPA). Companies from countries that signed the GPA, including
the USA, Canada, Israel and Japan, can participate on equal terms as companies from
member-states of the EU. Promoting the adoption by other countries of such a unified
procurement code is crucial to fight corruption in large purchases. On the other hand,
governments have to be pragmatic. For small purchases the cost of running a competitive
bidding procedure is prohibitive. In most countries in the world there is hence a minimum
size below which the purchases are authorized directly by government officials. This rule
is consistent with the result in Proposition 4.
The second result from Proposition 4 is that, whatever the distribution of corruptibility
in the population, when Q ∈ [K
k
, K
k
] the optimal policy is either to implement the capture
or the extortion regime. Contrary to the symmetric information case, there is no loss
of discretion in response to the corruption threat. However, there is a change in the
discretion rule. The choice between the capture and the extortion regime depends, for a
of the population which is honest is
[
1
1+δl
]θ
. When θ → 0 the whole population is honest, and when
θ → +∞ it is totally corrupted.
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given distribution G(.) on Q. Since the transfer Q∆pi
1+δl
increases more than proportionally
when market size increases (because δl decreases when Q increases), it becomes very costly
to implement the capture regime for the large value of Q. The principal chooses rather
a competitive procedure whenever the delegate claims that σ = ∅, which implies that
extortion occurs.
Static comparative analysis shows that when the susceptibility to corruption in the
population rises (in A5 sense), the delegate’s decisions that might lead to capture are
reduced.29 However, contrary to the symmetric information case, it is never totally sup-
pressed. When corruption runs very high the capture regime is limited to the interval
Q ∈ [K
k
, K
κ
]. Indeed, for this range of the parameters, suppressing the discretion of the
delegate would mean ignoring her information by always choosing limited tender, which
is the decision that a corrupted delegate (i.e., δ ≤ δl) is going to implement anyway (a
corrupted delegate announces σˆ = ∅ when σ = N). On the other hand, a relatively honest
delegate (i.e., δ ≥ δl) is going to implement the principal’s preferred decision in exchange
for the bonus. For Q ∈ [K
k
, K
κ
], bypassing delegate information means the loss of this occa-
sional increase in surplus without providing any corresponding benefit.30 Concretely this
implies that in countries plagued by corruption extortion runs high. Legislation should
hence make a distinction between facilitation payments and payments made to bypass
competition. The former is a business cost, the latter is a crime against the taxpay-
ers. The theoretical analysis also suggests that to fight capture the purchasers should
29The critical value δl decreases with corruption (in A5 sense), so that Qλ(δl)− K
k
also decreases with
corruption. Since αξ+1−ξαξ
κQ−K
k
is constant we deduce from proposition 4 that the capture regime is less
implemented when corruption increases.
30Formally, we see from equation (10) that Qλ(δl) − K
k
= 1
k
1−G(δl)
g(δl)(1+δl)
≥ 0 ∀Q ∈ [K
k
, KEk ]. Moreover
αξ+1−ξ
αξ
κQ−K
k
≤ 0 ∀Q ∈ [K
k
, Kκ ]. Proposition 4 implies that the capture regime is always implemented.
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be awarded a bonus increasing with the market value. Britain pioneered such an incen-
tive system. The top government officials receive a portion of the end of the fiscal year
difference between their budget allowances and what they actually spent (Vaknin 2004).31
5 Conclusion
Facilitation payments are generally not covered by anti-bribery conventions. In contrast
bribes for capture are against most national and international laws. There is a sound
rationale for that: capture yields a dead-weight loss while extortion does not. Based on
the model calibration, the loss from capture represents between 4.14 % and 9.93% of the
world procurement spending. Such level of government inefficiency calls for structural
reform. Reforming public purchases is politically easier than, for instance privatizing
and deregulating public utilities. Yet, international comparisons illuminate large gaps
in governments’ commitment to fight capture. For instance, under the GPA, limited
tendering procedure is permissible only under very restrictive conditions. Nevertheless,
its use varies widely across signatories from a reported zero level in Singapore and in
Finland to more than 30 percent on average in France, Hong Kong, and Austria (see
Hoekman 1998). Similarly, many former European colonies and most European countries
such as France, have immunity laws to protect politicians in corruption cases (Barreto
and Kessler 2004). They do not maintain a list of debarred suppliers: Firms that have
been found guilty of active corruption are allowed to bid for new public contracts. The
implementation of e-procurement is slow. Finally, the purchasers are not monitored and
they receive the same reward no matter what size of the market they are dealing with.
31Similarly Alkadry (2004) found a statistical significant positive effect of the annual procurement
volume on compensation of 448 heads of public procurement units and 414 supervisors and materials
managers in the US public sector.
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It is hard to believe that such an inefficient public procurement framework has been
designed while bearing cost minimization in mind. There is much documented evidence
that political parties finance their campaigns, and their leaders’ private accounts, with the
money from capture. For instance in 2003, business leaders regarded illegal donations to
political parties as common or fairly common in 41 percent of the 102 surveyed countries
by the World Economic Forum. Among them we find mainly democracies. In contrast,
in only 18 percent of the countries, including authoritarian regimes such as China, do
business leaders claim that they are rare or fairly rare. Even though political competition
is vital for democracy, the question of how it should be financed is not settled. The paper
highlights that financing it with the money from capture is socially inefficient.
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APPENDIX 1: Proof of Proposition 2
Let FNmin(β) = 1−(1−F (β))N be the cumulative distribution of min(β1, ..., βN). One can
check that k(N) =
∫ β
β [1+
d
dβ
(
F (β)
f(β)
)
]FN−1min (β)
(
1−F (β)
)
dβ, and that ∆pi =
∫ β
β F
N−1
min (β)F (β)dβ.
It yields after some integration by part: k(N)−∆pi = ∫ ββ (1−F (β))
{
FN−1min (β)
fN−1min (β)
−F (β)
f(β)
}
dFN−1min (β).
Let S(β) = 1−F (β). We get: FN−1min (β)
fN−1min (β)
≥ F (β)
f(β)
⇔ 1−S(β)N−1 ≥ (N−1)[1−S(β)]S(β)N−2
which is true for all N ≥ 2 since S(β) ∈ [0, 1]. We deduce that k(N)−∆pi ≥ 0 for N ≥ 2.
APPENDIX 2: Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
Proposition 3: Taking into account the capture-proofness rent that he must abandon
to the delegate (i.e., Q∆pi
1+δ
when σ = N is pivotal information) and the informational rent
that he must abandon to the firms,32 the principal’s expected welfare function is:33
EV = (1−ξ)
{
(1−x∅)W + x∅
(
αEWN+(1−α)EWN
)}
+ ξ(1−α)
{
(1−xN )W + xNEWN
}
+ ξα
{
(1−xN )W + xNEWN − xN (1−x∅) Q∆pi
1+δ
}
.
The principal’s objective is to maximize with respect to xσ ∈ [0, 1] the function EV .
Since EV is linear in xσ at the optimum the probabilities are either 0 or 1: xσ ∈ {0, 1}.
Recall that EWN − W = k(N)Q − K with k(N) defined equation (4). We get that
EV = (1−ξ)
{
W + x∅
(
QEk −K
)}
+ ξ(1−α)
{
W + x
N
(
Qk −K
)}
+ ξα
{
W + x
N
(
Qk −K − (1−x∅)Q∆pi
1+δ
)}
.
Optimizing EV with respect to xσ ∈ {0, 1} it is easy to check that:
- If Qk −K < 0 then xN = xN = x∅ = 0 (i.e., limited tender);
32The rent has the same shape as in section 3 because the information structure between the delegate
and the firms regarding βi is unchanged.
33To understand how the principal objective function is built, consider the case when the delegate
learns nothing, σ = ∅. The associated expected welfare is V ∅ = (1−x∅)W + x∅
(
αEWN+(1−α)EWN
)
,
which corresponds to the first parenthesis. It occurs with probability (1−ξ). The second parenthesis
corresponds to the case where the delegate learns that σ = N , and the third parenthesis to the case
where σ = N . These events occur with the probability ξ(1− α) and ξα respectively.
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- If Qk −K > 0 then xN = xN = x∅ = 1 (i.e., open tender);
- If Qk −K < 0 < QEk −K then xN = 0 and xN = x∅ = 1 (i.e., extortion regime).
We deduce that for Q ∈ [0, K
k
] ∪ [ K
Ek
,+∞) the optimal rule is as described Proposition 1.
The new part of the analysis arises for Q ∈ [K
k
, K
Ek
]. In this case Qk −K < 0 so that
x
N
= 0. The principal maximizes with respect to x
∅
, x
N ∈ {0, 1}:
EV = W + (1−ξ)x∅
(
QEk −K
)
+ αξx
N
[
(1−x∅)
(
Qλ(δ)k −K
)
+ x∅
(
Qk −K
)]
.
Since x
N
= 0, several cases occur:
- If Qλ(δ) ≤ K
k
and Qκ ≤ K then xN = x∅ = 0 (i.e., limited tender).34
- If Qλ(δ) ≥ K
k
and Qκ ≤ K, then xN = 1 and x∅ = 0 (i.e., capture-proofness).
- If Qλ(δ) ≤ K
k
and Qκ ≥ K then xN = x∅ = 1 (i.e., extortion).
- If Qλ(δ) ≥ K
k
and Qκ ≥ K then xN = 1. For x∅ two cases are possible:
- If (αξ+1−ξ)Qκ−(1−ξ)K
αξk
≤ Qλ(δ) then x∅ = 0 (i.e., capture-proofness),
- If (αξ+1−ξ)Qκ−(1−ξ)K
αξk
> Qλ(δ) then x∅ = 1 (i.e., extortion).
Aggregating the results yields Proposition 3.
Proposition 4: We maximize with respect to xσˆ ∈ [0, 1]:
EV
AI
= (1−ξ)
{
(1−x∅)W +x∅
(
αEWN+(1−α)EWN
)}
+ξ(1−α)
{
(1−xN )W +xNEWN
}
+ξα
{
(1−xN )W + xNx∅EWN + xN (1−x∅)
(
(1−G(δl))
(
EWN − Q∆pi
1+δl
)
+G(δl)EW
)}
with
W = S(Q) − β, EWN defined equation (3), Q∆pi equation (6), δl equation (10). The
proof of Proposition 4 is similar to that of Proposition 3.
APPENDIX 3: Calibration of L = ∆β
β+∆β
N−1
N+1
B
b
• Data on e-procurement and on competitive bidding suggest that ∆β
β+∆β
≥ 0.2
34Indeed if Qλ(δ)k −K ≤ 0 then αξxN (1−x∅) = 0 and if αξ(Qk −K) + (1 − ξ)(QEk −K) ≤ 0 then
x∅ = 0.
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• For the number of bidders I rely on the US Federal Procurement Data. The following
summary table of US federal procurement data has been kindly provided by Paul
Murphy from Eagle Eye Publishers Inc. I am very grateful for his help.
Number of Offers Amount ($000) % of Total Actions
1 $109,634,111 40.68% 217,973
2-5 $100,658,576 37.35% 329,00
6-10 $22,007,186 8.17% 67,016
11-15 $6,209,296 2.30% 27,063
16-20 $3,998,960 1.48% 11,930
21-50 $7,265,024 2.70% 26,983
OVER 50 $19,755,081 7,33% 108,188
Source: Eagle Eye Publishers Inc., Fairfax, Virginia - November 09, 2004.
The first column lists the number of offers received by the Federal authority. The
second column lists the value of the markets in thousands of US dollars. The
third column expresses these amounts as a percentage of the total federal markets’
value. The last column lists the number of contracts in each category. In US
federal procurement 40.68 % of the markets (in value) is attributed through direct
negotiation with a single producer. This corresponds to the ”limited tender” cases
in this paper. It covers many defense contracts. The other procedures, representing
59.3 % of procurement value, involve 2 offers or more. They are denoted ”open
tender” in the paper. To compute the average number of tender I add the average
number of offers in each category (assuming a uniform distribution) weighted by its
market share in value (i.e., % of the total). For instance the weight of group [2, 5]
is 5+2
2
0.373 = 1.31. We deduce that EN = 2+5
2
0.373 + 6+10
2
0.082 + 11+15
2
0.023 +
16+20
2
0.015 + 21+50
2
0.027 + (50)0.073 = 7.139. To fix a lower bound for N , I focus on
the average number of tenders for federal procedures involving less than 50 offers.35
35Public purchases with more than 50 tenders are typically standardized commodities. They are less
likely to involve capture.
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Subtracting from EN = 7.139 the value (50)0.073 yields EN ≥ 7.139−3.65 = 3.489.
• Estimates of b are available through survey techniques and police investigations.
For instance the average amount paid in bribes as a percentage of the total cost of
doing business would be 5% in Asia (The Economist 1995). This figure is consistent
with the opinion of Zhu Shaoping, a legal expert about Chinese public purchases:
”Commonly, an average of 5 percent of the country’s total governmental investments
ends up in private purses in the form of kickbacks” (Shangai Star 2001). Similarly,
TI in Nepal conducted a study at the municipal level to evaluate the impact of
the adoption of an integrity pact. TI found that, before the implementation of the
integrity pact, the level of bribes were between 5% and 6%.36 In Pakistan, a kickback
commission at the rate of 6% of the total contract was agreed upon with French
companies, including Aerospatiale and Thompson CSF, for naval defense contracts
(Farooq 2001). In France, the bribes paid by firms in construction markets in the
area of Paris were found to be between 5% and 10% (Le Monde 1996). A reasonable
lower bound for b then is 5%. It is worth noting that the 5% bound is consistent
with the World Bank estimates which put bribes paid to win public market in the
vicinity of 3.5% of total procurement cost. Since capture does not occur in all public
purchases, when it occurs, on average, the bribe cut is higher. Finally, an upper
bound for b is derived from the theoretical analysis. By assumption B ≤ ∆Π which
is equivalent to b ≤ ∆β
β+∆β
N(N+1)−2
2N(N+1)
. With ∆β
β+∆β
= 0.2 and N = 3 we get that
∆β
β+∆β
N(N+1)−2
2N(N+1)
= 1
12
.
• We deduce that L ∈ [1.2, 2.88]B. The cost L = 1.2B, is computed under the
36See www.transparency.org/toolkits/2001/ccinp ip-nepal.html.
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conservative assumptions that the maximal dispersion in production cost is 20%,
that the average number of bidders is 3 and that delegates are able to grab the
entire benefit from capture, B = ∆Π. It is really a lower bound.37
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